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Abstract 
Standard economic theory assumes money to be neutral, at least in the long run, driven 
by interregional arbitrage and perfect capital mobility. This may easily be used as a 
justification for regional economists to ignore monetary factors. However, in a world 
with market imperfections, such arguments are no longer valid. This paper provides a 
critical review of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the issue. Special 
attention is devoted to asymmetric information problems caused by geographical factors. 
We conclude that monetary policy and financial markets can have a potentially important 
role to play in promoting regional development especially in less-developed countries. 
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1. Introduction  
The re-emergence and fast development of regional science has been gaining momentum 
once more, especially in the last decade, after a period of “crisis” as diagnosed by Bailly 
and Coffey (1994). Considering regional economics in particular, despite this revival, 
there is still little attention devoted to the role of monetary policy in regional economic 
development.  
An important reason why monetary policy tends to be largely ignored in 
economic theories of development is mainly because of a traditional postulate that money 
is neutral (at least in the long run). Thereby, monetary variables are only considered as a 
medium of exchange with no implications for long-run economic development. 
Nonetheless, money is not necessarily neutral because of the potential relevance of 
market failures, such as asymmetric information problems which will result in, for 
example, spatial segmentation of capital markets.2 In the presence of such imperfections, 
new-Keynesian economics has argued that indeed money may have an influential role for 
regional growth (see Samolyk, 1991, 1994; Greenwald-Levinson-Stiglitz, 1993; Faini et 
al., 1993). Money in this terminology is not limited to monetary policy conducted by a 
central bank but also embraces, more broadly, financial markets, such as banks, stock 
markets, venture capital, etc. As Levine (1997) pointed out, financial institutions have the 
important capacity to mobilize savings and reinvest them in a more efficient and 
productive way. In turn, they could facilitate output growth.  
Meanwhile, in view of the growing trend among central banks around the world 
to confine monetary policy to the use of Inflation Targeting as their policy framework, a 
good understanding of regional economic structures and characteristics has now become 
more important than it was previously, primarily because the national inflation rate 
                                                 
2
 The way how money can affect output due to imperfect information was first studied by Lucas (1972) and 
Phelps (1970). The Lucas-Phelps model was used and further developed by amongst others, Blanchard and 
Kitoyaki (1987), and Rotemberg (1987). It emphasizes that unanticipated monetary policy may affect real 
variables (in contrast to anticipated ones). Keynesian economics emphasizes price stickiness (including 
wages and interest rates) that arise in a market, where information does not flow properly among economic 
agents (for further discussion, see Romer, 1996). 
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originates from the aggregation of regional inflation rates within an economy. Therefore, 
understanding regional aspects is a fundamental pillar in meeting national targets.  
The relevance of studying the complex relationship between finance and regional 
development has become gradually more apparent in view of the asymmetric shocks that 
have hit European economies since the introduction of the Euro in recent years. This also 
holds for less developed countries such as Indonesia, India and China, where large 
economic areas are divided into many (decentralized) regions, while monetary policy 
solely operates for the national economy. Hence, a discussion of this issue might be very 
relevant for those countries too in order to find optimal stabilization policies in the light 
of regional heterogenous shocks. 
The main objective of this study is to analyse and survey how monetary and, more 
broadly, financial sectors may have an influence on regional development from both a 
theoretical and an empirical point of view. This will lead to an evaluation of the relevance 
of monetary policies and financial markets in facilitating regional growth. 3  
Furthermore, this study also attempts to make some refinements and extensions to 
the existing literature. More specifically, we aim to analyse the link between regional 
monetary impacts, optimum currency area theory and the role of interregional capital 
mobility as an adjustment mechanism to differential shocks. Finally, having argued that 
capital flows across regions may be imperfect, we could assert that there is a strong link 
between monetary/financial institutions and regional development. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses briefly the 
theoretical aspect of regional monetary transmissions.  It is divided into two subsections 
which focus respectively, on the interest rate channel and the bank-lending channel.. 
Section 3 surveys the empirical literature.  Based on the optimum currency area literature, 
Section 4 critically discusses whether in reality capital across regions is as mobile as 
envisaged by the classical approach. Having illuminated by reference to several studies 
that the hypothesis may not hold, we then emphasize that spatial effects may play an 
                                                 
3
 Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes (1997) and Rodriguez-Fuentes (2005) have undertaken literature surveys of 
how monetary policy may affect regional economies. They also discuss the differences between two main 
strands in economics, i.e. between monetarist (orthodox) and post-Keynesian theory in the viewing 
relationship between monetary policy (financial sector) and regional development. The former posits that 
regional monetary impact is exogenous to money, while the latter argues it is endogenous (see Rodriguez-
Fuentes and Dow, 2003).  
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important role in inhibiting the mobility of capital across regions or a monetary union. 
Finally, Section 5 attempts to conclude and ends with some policy lessons. 
 
2. Aggregate Monetary Policy and the Disaggregate Regional Economy  
Theoretically, monetary policy may influence the real economy through different 
channels, such as the interest rate, bank-lending, the exchange rate, balance-sheets, asset 
prices, and expectation channel. In the remainder of this section, we focus on the 
domestic transmission channels that are likely to be most relevant for regional economic 
development, viz. the interest rate and bank-lending channels.  
 
2.1. Regional Monetary Transmission Mechanism: a Brief Theoretical Approach  
2.1.1. Interest Rate Channel  
The interest rate affects the real economy through the cost of capital. Increased money 
supply reduces the cost of capital, which may positively affect investments and 
subsequent growth, provided that the increased money supply reduces the real cost of 
capital on account of, for example, price stickiness, or alternatively that investments also 
in part respond to the nominal interest rate (e.g. Mishkin, 1995; Taylor, 1995; Mankiw, 
1997).    
The change in monetary policy could also affect consumption. First, an 
unexpected increase in the (real) interest rate will lower consumption. Second, 
households will become more pessimistic about future income and will reduce their 
consumption as compared with their planned consumption. Furthermore, anticipated 
increases of the (real) interest rate may have already resulted in lower consumption prior 
to the interest rate change through an expectations channel (Mahadeva and Sinclair, 
2001). 
At the regional level, the analysis of the transmission of monetary policies is 
slightly different, since every region has its typical economic structure and 
characteristics. Thereby a national monetary policy may affect different regions 
differently. An illustration is provided below in Figure 1, which describes how two 
economic regions in one country (for simplicity) may be affected differently by a 
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common interest rate. 4 The Core region (A) typically has a positive perceived investment 
climate, and hence has a strong investment demand. Meanwhile the Peripheral region (B) 
has characteristics of low investment perceptions and therefore experiences weak 
investment demand.  
Monetary policy is typically targeted at the national economy, and hence the 
interest-rate below called the policy-rate is set equally for all its regions (represented by a 
horizontal LM curve in Figure 1). As Owyang and Wall (2005) posit in this context: “…. 
the Fed holds the view that monetary policy cannot and should not be used to affect 
particular regions or states”.5  
 
Figure 1. Regional monetary transmission through the interest rate channel 
 
Now suppose that, in order to achieve its national target (let us say maintaining 
price stability), the monetary authority has imposed a uniform interest-rate (R*) over the 
two regions. Because the regions have different economic structures, the common policy 
may have differential impacts.  
This interest rate is favourable to Region A since it is consistent with full 
employment or growth. In contrast, such an interest rate is unfavourable to region B 
                                                 
4
 Modified from McCann (2001). 
5
 Non-neutrality of money at the regional level has been long discussed in the Keynesian approach (see, for 
example, Dow, 1982; Cottrell, 1986; Tobin, 1991). 
Core Region Peripheral Region 
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which cannot maintain its natural growth at FY , but instead experiences an output loss 
equal to *F BY Y−   
This simple diagrammatic analysis has indicated that two regions within a country 
may face differential impacts of aggreate monetary policy via the interest-rate channel. In 
the next subsection, we will consider the regional impact of monetary policy through the 
bank-lending channel.6 
 
2.1. 2. Bank-lending Channel  
Banks play an important role as intermediary agents in the financial market and as 
such in absorbing asymmetric shocks that may arise in credit markets. If banks are the 
only source of funds for borrowers, then monetary transmission through the bank-lending 
channel may work accordingly. A loose monetary policy will increase bank deposits, 
resulting in huge credit availability. In turn, if the increase of bank loans is used by 
certain borrowers, this will increase investments and potentially consumer spending, and 
subsequently output will also rise. 
       Next, in order to shed some further light on the effect of regional monetary policy 
through the bank-lending channel, we will use a similar approach as in Section 2.1. 
above. There are again two regions within a country (core and periphery), but with 
different economic structures. Assume that banks in the core region A have more access 
to credit from other sources of funding elsewhere, so they have a strong liquidity level. In 
contrast, banks in the peripheral region B face liquidity constraints. Thus demand for 
credit in region A is relatively high compared with region B. As previously discussed, the 
core region is perceived to have high investment opportunities, while the situation 
prevails for the peripheral region. 
The better perceived investment climate following from the lower degree of 
uncertainity of region A compared with B implies that its (credit) interest rate is lower.  
Following best practice, the risk assessment conducted by banks will determine which 
part of a certain project will be funded, and in turn this could be mirrored by the 
                                                 
6
 For further analysis, we will use the notion of asymmetric effects of monetary policy only for analysis 
across regions, despite several studies which also use the notion for highlighting the differential effect of 
monetary policy over time (see Florio, 2004). 
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magnitude of the lending rate. In other words, a riskier project will have a higher lending 
rate, since it is more costly7 relative to a less risky one.  
Following an approach by Dow and Montagnoli (2007), assume there are two 
segmented regions each with their own bank.  The national banking system has a local 
monopoly in finance in Region B, while borrowers in Region A have access to alternative 
sources of finance (see Figure 2 a,b,c). Hence, credit demand in region A is relatively 
elastic than region B, that is described by the relatively flat AR curve. The MR curve 
represents the marginal revenue of the banks.  The marginal cost of funds is represented 
by MC.  The equilibrium supply of credit in the national economy is where marginal 
costs and revenues intersect.  This determines the benchmark interest rate which is 
supplemented by a mark-up by local banks reflecting their liquidity preferences and a 
premium for perceived risk.  
Figure 2 a), b), c).  Regional bank-lending channel 
 
Now suppose region A faces macroeconomic instability due to inflation pressure, 
which potentially affects the entire economy. In response, the central bank increases its 
interest rate. This in turn, will induce an upward shift of the MC curve in both regions 
                                                 
7
 Banks are normally required to add more reserves (loss provision) for a riskier project, since this may be 
viewed as their cushion if the project quality is deterioriating.  More provisions allocated for riskier project 
mean higher costs of fund for the bank since they have to pay interest to their depositors as well.  
Furthermore, banks are obliged to do this by the regulator.   
Core Region Peripheral Region 
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equally, from 0MC to 1MC  that is shown at the aggregate level in Figure 2c which 
represents the national economy.  Next, the intersection of the MC and MR curve will 
also change (moving upwards).   
Since region A has more elastic demand, the rise of the central bank’s rate will 
result in a relatively strong increase of the lending rate (from oR to 1R ), as well as a 
decrease of the supply of credits (from oC to 1C ).  D-M summarize the effects as follows: 
“The cost of credit rises more in region A ….than in region B….. in absolute terms, but 
proportionately more in region B relative to the fall in credit level”. This is because 
region A has more access to alternative funding sources than region B, thereby reducing 
the adverse impact of the increased cost of credit. 
 
3. Empirical Evidence  
3.1. Survey of Empirical Studies 
A study by Carlino and DeFina (1998) revealed why the change of the Fed policy rate has 
a differential impact across states due to differences in their economic structures and 
characteristics. The main reasons for the asymmetries are based on the variations in the 
interest-rate sensitivity of a region’s industrial mix, the share of small firms in the local 
economy, and the share of small banks in the local economy. Mixes in the industrial 
sector are relevant because of the “interest rate channel”, while the firms’ and the banks’ 
size have an effect through the “credit channel”.8 
Following the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), a robust 
understanding of how monetary policy affects regional economies became a “hot issue” 
for many European economists. Arnold’s (1999) contribution focuses directly on the 
regional impact of monetary policy by simply measuring the correlation between regional 
GDP growth and interest rate changes across European countries. Even with the many 
caveats noted by the author (limited sample, annual frequency, non-homogeneity of the 
business cycle phase across regions), the results strongly suggest a negative relationship 
between interest rate increases and regional growth.  
                                                 
8
 Quoted from McPherson and Waller (2000). 
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De Lucio and Izquierdo (2002) focus on the intensity of the reaction of Spanish 
regional economies to a common monetary shock using a vector autoregression (VAR) 
methodology. The endogenous variable used in the second step of their analysis is the 
long-run response in employment. The set of potential determinants of asymmetries is 
very similar to the one used by Carlino and DeFina (1999) for states in the USA.  
Similarly, by using Spanish regional data, Ramos et al. (1999) have analysed the 
asymmetric response of regional economies to a national monetary shock. They provide 
support for the hypothesis that the distribution of industrial sectors such as manufacturing 
and construction across regions has been a main driving force behind asymmetric 
responses to the national monetary policy. Average firm size also played a key-role in 
explaining regional differences. They also consider the importance of ‘firm size’, since it 
could also be an indicator of credit constraints, since larger firms are more likely to use, 
for example, retained profits and find it easier to receive loans in the capital market. c 
Table 1. Taxonomy of differential impacts of regional monetary transmissions 
 
Classification 
of Factors Key Variables 
Type of Region with respect to Monetary Policy Changes 
More Sensitive Less sensitive 
Compositional Sectoral mix 
 
Demand mix 
 
Degree of 
openness 
Firm size 
 
Bank size 
Manufacturing industries, 
Property 
High Investment, 
Consumption 
Low degree of Export-Import 
intensity 
Small-Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs),household businesses  
Small banks 
 
Non-manufacturing industries 
(Agriculture, Services, etc.) 
Low Investment, Export-Import 
oriented, Consumption demand 
High degree of Export-Import 
intensity 
Big companies /enterprises  
  
National banks, Foreign banks 
Behavioural  Bank health 
Source of fund 
(for borrowers) 
Banking 
concentration 
Poor/lack of soundness  
Highly bank-dependent  
 
Retail banking  
Sound/healthy  
Availability of non-banks as 
alternative sources  
Corporate and international 
banking 
 
Institutional  Labour 
structure 
 
Availability of 
financial 
market centre  
 
Wage earners-income type / 
Industrial labor 
Many and various type of 
financial institutions are 
available (bank, stock 
exchange, venture capital, 
etc) 
 
Profit/rent earners  
 
Limited alternatives in financial 
markets, mostly rural banks 
 Source: Extracted various studies . 
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Table 1 above attempts to extract some underlying sources that explain regional 
variation of the impacts of monetary policy that have been studied empirically across 
countries. Regional differences in the industrial mix, the structure of the financial sector, 
and firm size are most frequently cited as potential sources of this variation. In addition, 
some studies provide other sources of regional heterogeneity besides those mentioned 
here, such as: the degree of wage and price rigidity (Holmes, 2000); the regional housing 
market (Fratantoni and Schuh, 2003); the institutional features of the labour market 
(Arnold, 1999); the share of state exports and fluctuations of the real exchange rate 
(Weber, 2003). 
 
3.2. Empirical Methodology 
The recent empirical literature on regional monetary transmission mostly employs VARs 
(vector autoregressions), whereas previously they used “large” econometric models.9 The 
VAR approach is capable of exploring transmission mechanisms of monetary policy as 
well as making a dynamic evaluation of its impact on the economy. Another advantage of 
using VAR is that it is rather neutral to the endogeneity problem, since the method can 
itself determine the identification of the variables. Compared with the former large 
models, the VAR approach is able to shed light on the propagation process of a non-
anticipated impulse on the economic system (exogenous shock) without estimating the 
overall effects of monetary policy. Therefore, it clearly isolates the exogenous component 
from its endogenous response to the economy. 
Sims (1972, 1980) developed the first generation of VAR models that basically fall 
under the heading of atheoretical macroeconometrics. These early models were 
“unrestricted” VAR model in which each current variable is regressed on all the variables 
in the model lagged a certain number of periods. His approach basically “let[s] the data 
speak themselves”. It thus solely aims to minimize errors.  
 The pioneering work of using VAR modelling in the estimation of regional 
asymmetric reactions to shocks can be found in Carlino and DeFina (1999). They studied 
the dynamic behaviour of regional (state) covariance stationary vectors defined as:  
                                                 
9
 For example, Fishkind (1977), Miller (1978) and Garrison and Chang (1978). 
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Zs,t= (∆xs,t , ∆xr-s,t, ∆ xr2t,…∆xr8,t , ∆c1t , ∆c2t , ∆c3t, ∆ mt)’              (1)        
where ∆xs denotes real income growth in state s, ∆xr-s is growth of real income in the 
region containing the state, excluding the state’s own income; ∆ xr2,....∆xr8 denote the 
other macroregion’s real income; ∆c’s are three macroeconomic control variables; and 
∆m is a measure of monetary policy actions.  
The dynamics of Zst is represented by:  
A Zs,t = B(L) Zs,t-1 + εs,t                     (2) 
where A is a square matrix of dimensionality, equal to the number of regions in the 
system, which describes the contemporaneous correlations among the variables; B(L) is a 
square matrix of polynomials in the lag operators (L); and εs,t is a vector of structural 
disturbances for each region, which shows the way each regional variable of the system is 
influenced by its own regional shock, as well as by shocks to all other variables.  
The system can thus be written as:  
Zs,t = C(L) Zs,t-1 + us,t                                 (3) 
where C(L) = A–1B(L) describes how contemporaneous and subsequent effects of shocks 
to each variable combine; and us,t= A-1εs,t describes the relationship between reduced-
form and structural residuals.  The impacts of policy shocks are summarized by using the 
impulse-response functions that are calculated from Equation  3 as  
Zs,t = [I - C(L)L] -1 + A-1εs,t    =    ( )Lφ εs,t                                                  (4) 
  whereas 
             
0
( )
L
l
l
l
L Lφ φ
=
= ∑                                       
in which lφ  is a k x k matrix of structural parameters (for further details, see Enders, 
2004). 
By using US regional (state) experience as a benchmark, Carlino and DeFina 
(1999) were able to simulate the possible sensitivity of each EMU nation to a common 
monetary shock. In particular, they calculated an index using some European national 
variables and the coefficients obtained from cross-section regressions for the US linking 
the long-run effects of monetary policy (within eight quarters) to the same state-level 
variables for the US. When the US analysis was applied to European nations, the authors 
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found that reactions are more pronounced in EMU countries, and particularly so in the 
more peripheral ones.  
 
4. Capital Mobility as an Adjustment Mechanism  
Having shed light on how monetary policy may differently affect regions or countries 
which share the same currency (or which have fixed exchange rates), this section looks 
further into capital mobility and the literature on optimum currency areas (OCA).10 One 
of the most important adjustment mechanisms that is put forward in this research area is 
flexible factor markets characterized by a high degree of factor mobility and adjustable 
factor prices.  
We will therefore now turn to a further discussion of interregional capital mobility 
as one of the critical mechanisms identified in most of the studies.11 This issue is of 
particular interest for our review since most relevant studies within this area focus on the 
international dimension instead of the regional dimension.  
 
4.1. Is Capital Freely Mobile Across Regions?  
As postulated by the classical approaches, differences in rates of return to capital among 
regions will not be sustained in the long run when financial markets are integrated. The 
mechanism behind this is illustrated in Figure 3. The figure assumes a peripheral region 
(left axis) which initially experiences a high interest rate (R0), while the interest rate in 
the core region (right axis) is low (R0*). As a consequence, the rate of return on capital is 
relatively high in Region 1 and it will attract capital in the presence of capital mobility, 
until equilibrium is achieved in point E (see Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2004).  
                                                 
10
 The theory of optimum currency areas originated from the article by Mundell (1961). The theory 
attempts to explain the desirability for a group of countries to adopt the same currency and be ruled under a 
single monetary policy. Those countries with a common monetary policy may expect it will enhance 
economic integration amongst them, through lowering transaction costs by using the same currency and 
fixing their exchange rates. 
11
 Several studies highlight interregional labour mobility across regions in the USA and European countries 
(see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Barro et al., 1995; Nijkamp and Poot, 1998; Duczynski, 2000). 
Although conventional theory proposes labour mobility as a main adjustment factor, Beetsma and 
Vermeylen (2005) argue that such a mechanism may work at best imperfectly in the EMU, since there are 
still barriers to labour mobility in its member countries due to differences of language, culture and 
institutions. Alternatively, adjustment mechanisms may rely upon a well-functioning redistribution system 
that can equalize across the regions/countries (see, for example, Von Hagen, 1992, 1999).  
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The empirically relevant question is, of course, to what extent capital is truly 
mobile. The seminal contribution in this area of research is Feldstein and Horioka (1980). 
They showed that there was a high correlation between the national saving rates and 
domestic investment rates among OECD countries in the 1960s and early 1970s. They 
posit that savings and investments would be perfectly correlated in a closed economy, but 
should be unrelated in an open economy since savings would be directed to countries 
with the highest rate of return (Coakley et al., 1998).  
 
Figure 3. Perfect capital flow and interest-rate equalization 
 
Bayoumi and Rose (1993) use UK regional data from 1971-1985 to study intra-
national capital mobility and found that capital in those regions is perfectly mobile 
(because saving and investment rates were not strongly correlated). Related studies also 
confirm their findings of perfect capital mobility at the sub-national level (e.g. Dekle 
(1996) based on Japanese prefectures; Bayoumi and Sterne (1993) based on Canadian 
provinces; and Asdrubali et al. (1996) based on the US states). 
Ozcan et al. (2006) use a different approach to study inter-state capital flows in 
the USA. Because of  the lack of capital income flows data at the state level, they develop 
an approach using output/income ratios as a proxy for the relative magnitude of net inter-
state capital income flows to a state. Using a simple neoclassical model, they found that, 
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in the states where there are no barriers to movement of capital, capital should flow to 
states that experience a relative increase in capital productivity. In addition, they found 
evidence that net capital income flows between US states are consistent with the 
predictions of a simple “frictionless” neoclassical model. 
Despite those conventional beliefs of perfect capital mobility at the subnational 
level, subsequent studies have arrived at different findings. The recent studies reviewed 
below have found that locational (spatial) effects should be incorporated in analysing 
mobility of capital in particular, which is neglected by the traditional approach.  
 
4.2. Barriers to Capital Mobility and the Locational Effect  
As mentioned above, the standard theory, which is supported by several empirical studies 
for developed countries, such as the USA, Canada, UK and Japan, points out that 
intranational financial markets are fully integrated and that capital is thus perfectly 
mobile.  However, some recent studies have contradicted these the results by showing 
that capital may not be freely mobile, not even at the subnational level, resulting in 
segmentation of markets.  
 One of the important gaps in the conventional view may be caused by ignorance 
or simplification of the role of spatial factors in shaping economic behaviour. Such view 
could be noted at least from Van Wincoop’s study (2001) that simplifies the key barrier 
of capital mobility to: “….. asymmetric information that is closely related to language, 
cultural and regulatory barriers, [and which] … is likely to be less relevant for regions 
within a country.”  Later he asserts that intranational capital will be perfectly mobile.   
In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss the role of spatial factors in 
influencing economic (financial) behaviour. This sheds some interesting light on factors 
that may result in capital being imperfectly mobile, even at the subnational level. 
 
4.2.1. Market Imperfections and Financial Sector across Space 
Despite the conventional belief that capital flows are perfectly mobile across regions 
within a single country, the information gaps and asymmetries12 between investors and 
                                                 
12
 Standard theory postulates that asymmetric information is relevant when information between borrower 
and lender is unbalanced. The former party can observe closely what the outcomes of a project are, while 
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borrowers that are separated in different locations may be substantial. Apart from 
stressing the information problems, Keynesian approaches also shed light on other types 
of market imperfections such as “home-bias” problems that also render financial (equity) 
markets to function suboptimally as an intermediary.13  
For the banking system in particular, a bank’s reluctance to channel its credit to 
peripheral regions results in a concentration of its business in the core region.14  In turn, 
such common information problems may result in an uneven distribution of financial 
capital across regions and persistent differences in rates of return with the associated 
welfare losses.15 
The theoretical literature has two underlying rationales for why distance should 
serve as a deterrent to lending.  First, commercial loans to small businesses (typically 
borrowers in regions, including households)16 concern the advantage that geographical 
proximity may give lenders in screening perspective borrowers and monitoring loans (see 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). As argued by Petersen and Rajan (2000) and Berger et al. 
(2002), lenders lack the “hard” information provided by detailed public financial 
statements typically available for large firms. As a consequence, they have to rely on 
“soft” information which is informally collected through relationships between the lender 
and the borrower. The collection of this soft information is costly to the lender, as it may 
require multiple site visits by a loan officer to the small business, or specialized 
knowledge of the local market in which the firm operates.17  
                                                                                                                                                 
the lender has to rely on the information submitted by borrowers and must incur costs to verify such 
information. Variations of information asymmetry problems in financial markets are adverse selection and 
moral hazard (see Mishkin, 2001).  
13
 Standard finance literature also documents other variants of imperfections in financial markets, such as 
agency problems, fundamental uncertainity, and interdependence. However, these variants are beyond the 
scope of this study. 
14
 This notion is consistent with the previous ones, and thus we continue to use core- and periphery- 
regions, city/urban/rich- and rural/remote/poor- area interchangeably in order to highlight differences in 
economic structures, and especially the role of geographical distance in the lending decision between those 
regions.  
15
 Myrdal (1957) has examined the ‘backwash’ effect of polarizing regional developments, according to 
which banks potentially siphon the savings of people in the poor region and reinvest them in the rich 
region. Accordingly, he contends that continuous growth in one region may occur at the expense of other 
regions or locations. 
16
 Credit to small businesses is an important driver for job creation and macroeconomic growth, both for 
regions and for the nation as a whole. 
17
 In addition, Berger et al. (2002) found that distance and the mode of interaction (preferably personal 
communication) between banks and borrowers may be at the advantage of small (local) banks that are 
better at using soft information than large banks that operate at a distance. Such kind of information is very 
16 
 
This version is as of 5/20/2008 1:39:48 PM 
 
Secondly, in the traditional approach of spatial competition models, borrower 
travel costs are emphasized.  Prospective borrowers must incur travel costs to do business 
with a lender, and pretty much the same also applies to depositors who want to deposit 
their money in one depository institution rather than others. Several studies have been 
conducted to understand this rationale (see, e.g.  Chiappori et al., 1995; and Park and 
Pennacchi, 2003). Based on the two rationales above, the main implications of distance to 
lending disbursements are spatial price discrimination and limited credit supply faced by 
small firms, particularly those in remote regions.   
However, it is crucial to differentiate between asymmetric information and 
transportation cost models of lending. In pure transportation-cost models, spatial 
discrimination only takes place through loan pricing because all borrowers who are 
deemed creditworthy obtain credit from the closest bank and never switch lenders. In an 
asymmetric-information setting, banks can strategically use proprietary information to 
create a threat of adverse selection for their rivals, thereby softening price competition. 
At the periphery of a bank’s market, however, the informational advantage is smaller so 
that competitors attempt to poach customers more aggressively (see Agarwal and 
Hauswald, 2006; Porteous, 1995). 
There are an increasing number of empirical studies that seek to explain the role 
of distance (information asymmetries) in lending decisions. A study by Degryse and 
Ongena (2005) established on the basis of Belgian data that distance is an important 
determinant of lending decisions and that banks actually engage in spatial price 
discrimination. Similarly, DeYoung et al. (2008) show that the probability of default on 
small-business loans increases with the distance between borrower and lender, although 
the adoption of credit-scoring techniques reduces this effect.  Previously, Faini et al. 
(1993) previously also discussed the information asymmetries problem that has induced 
banks to discriminate between the Northern and Southern part of Italian regions in their 
pricing strategy.  
Using a unique data set of loan applications by small businesses in US states, 
Agarwal and Hauswald (2006) have studied the determinants of lending decisions and, 
                                                                                                                                                 
helpful in evaluating how to allocate their credits. This implicitly suggests that small local banks that 
operate in rural areas are better at disentangling such opaque information. 
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especially, the roles of private information and physical distance between a bank and its 
borrowers. They found that the likelihood of obtaining credit and the loan rate decrease 
with the bank-borrower distance and increase with the borrower-competitor distance, 
while controlling for a wide range of other aspects of the lending relationship.18 
In equity markets, several studies have shown that investors earn higher returns 
on investments in local companies than on investments in more distant companies. In 
other words, being located far from a company puts an investor at an information 
disadvantage that is clearly measurable. Other studies show that security analysts who are 
located closer to a company produce more accurate earnings forecasts than analysts who 
are located at a greater distance.  
Analysing informational asymmetries as revealed by proprietary equity trading, 
Hau (2001) using Germany data finds that traders located near a company’s headquarters 
outperform their competitors in intraday trading. Similarly, Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 
2001) analysed a large sample of managed mutual funds in the USA and found that fund 
managers earn abnormal returns from investments made within geographical proximity. 
They use as their vicinity measure a cut-off distance of 100 kilometres of a fund’s 
headquarters. In addition, Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2003) examine the stock 
investments of over 30,000 households in continental USA from 1991 to 1996. They find 
that the average household invests 31 percent of its portfolio in stocks located within 250 
miles. Loughran and Schultz (2006) have also used location as a proxy for information 
asymmetries and found that information asymmetries between rural firms and investors 
are particularly large, so that firms avoid issuing equity in the presence of these 
asymmetries. Rural firms also wait significantly longer when they finally decide to go 
public.  
The above mentioned studies are based on a seminal paper by Myers and Majluf 
(1984), who observed that information asymmetries between managers and outside 
investors can make it expensive to raise funds through equity offerings and may lead 
some financially constrained firms to forego valuable projects rather than sell stock. 
                                                 
18
 In contrast, using Swedish data, Carling and Lundberg (2002) find no evidence that distance is a 
determinant of a loan’s default probability. The effect of physical distance on financial decision making has 
also attracted attention in other areas. Similarly, Petersen and Rajan (2000) assert that the role of distance in 
the banking market tends to diminish due to technological factors . 
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Myers (1984) takes this observation further and develops a pecking order theory of 
capital structure. In this theory, firms issue equity only as a last resort, and capital 
structure is determined in large part by the firms’ ability to finance internally. 
Alternatively, wherever possible, it is argued that firms prefer to raise investment capital 
through debt financing rather than share issues. But then, as a result, as mentioned above, 
local or opaque firms may face an expensive source of financing. Again, greater distance 
implies a clear disadvantage in obtaining information. 
Next, let us consider the effect of physical distance on an equity market that  
relates to information asymmetries and home-bias, which is defined simply as ‘a 
preference for investing locally’.19 Numerous studies have been done to identify home-
bias effects. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) showed that investors tend to have more 
active and frequent transactions with stocks from Finnish firms that are located close to 
investors and also share the same language and culture rather than with foreign firms.  
Similarly, Goetzmann et al. (2008) study the behaviour of portfolio investors over 
the period 1995 to 2000, and reveal that urban investors are less diversified (focus on 
certain stocks) in managing their portfolio, contrary to standard portfolio theory that 
suggests diversification. Indeed, their behaviour is biased toward urbanism compared 
with rural investors.20 They furthermore collect some figures to explain the portfolio 
focus motivation, focusing on behavioral biases (bounded rationality and skewness 
preference), real and perceived informational advantage, local social competition, and 
hedging of non-tradable risk. 
In fact, the role of distance as an “informational barrier” in financial investment 
has been historically considered by the founding father of economics, Adam Smith 
(1976), who noted that “... in the home trade, his capital is never so long out of his sight 
as it frequently is in the foreign trade of consumption. He can know better the character 
                                                 
19
 Even though there is a bulk of literature discussing the home-bias effect internationally either in the 
equity or the goods market, at the intranational level the literature is scarce.  However, it is necessary to 
distinguish between information asymmetries and home-bias. 
20
 In other areas, such as the trade in goods, Wolf (2000) found that home bias is present within the US 
states, and the preferred explanation for such a trade barrier is a long distance relationship between seller 
and buyer region. In commercial real-estate markets, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) find strong evidence 
in their analysis that buyers tend to be local when information asymmetries between the parties are severe, 
and more remote otherwise.  
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and situation of the persons whom he trusts, and if he should happen to be deceived, he 
knows better the laws of the country from which he must seek redress….." 21 
 
4.2.2. Spatial Agglomeration in Equity Markets  
Besides the aforementioned information problem that may deter interregional fund 
arbitrage from working perfectly, security markets especially also have an interesting 
feature, since investors like to trade in places where markets are big . The reason is that 
the bigger the size of the market, the more liquid the market is, which in turn will 
guarantee more security and possibilities of portfolio diversification.  
The important role of the ‘big caps’ market can also be approached from the 
market price. As already pointed out by Samuelson (1965), financial markets are efficient 
because prices will follow a ‘martingale process’, which results from the high level of 
transactions.22 
With regard to the noticeable feature of the financial sector in that if displays a 
strong degree of spatial agglomeration in particular locations, usually large cities, the 
following observation by Glaeser (2005) is interesting: “…there are two major 
agglomeration economies at work. First, the role of the dense city as a center for idea 
flows. The high value of knowledge meant that being in the city was particularly 
valuable. It may even be that New York’s high density levels… helped New York finance 
continue to thrive because those high density levels are particularly conducive to chance 
meetings, regular exchanges of new ideas and the general flow of information…. 
(Second,) The costs of delivering manufactured goods depends only on transportation 
technology, but the cost of delivering services depends both on technology and on the 
value of the time involved by the participants in the transaction. Because services are by 
definition face-to-face, during an era of rising wages, there is an increased incentive to 
agglomerate these activities.” 23  
                                                 
21
 Quoted from Gordon and Bovenberg (1996). 
22
 A martingale process is one in which the price of a good varies randomly about a constant mean. Prices 
will conform to such a process if, on average, these remain stable. Since financial-asset prices include 
elements of risk and transactions costs, these will oscillate continually around a bid–ask price which 
becomes lower with larger volumes of transactions (Parr and Budd, 2000). 
23
 Quoted from Becker (2006). 
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A theoretical underpinning of such spatial agglomeration phenomena in the 
financial sector has been provided by Porteous (1995). He emphasises the importance of 
path-dependent processes. These provide the reason why financial centres which had 
located early in a certain place may then well be sustained in the long run because of their 
early set-up, as happened in Amsterdam, New York City, London, Tokyo, Hongkong and 
in other big cities around the world.  Some sources of economies of scales that can be 
exploited by financial industry clusters located in urban areas are information spillovers 
(including tacit information), immediate access to the market (timing factor), the market 
for high-skilled labour, and good Information and Communication Technology 
infrastructures.   
Becker (2006), amongst others has supported this theory by providing evidence 
that majority of the stock markets around the world are located in the largest cities, since 
much of the economic activity relating to the stock market takes place in these large 
cities. Therefore, countries with larger cities will have better developed stock markets 
because they can benefit from stronger agglomeration economies surrounding the stock 
market. 
 
4.3. Where is Capital Flowing To? 
The role of this subsection is to bring together the previous insights regarding 
information asymmetries and spatial agglomeration of capital that provide an important 
explanation for where capital tends to locate.  However, because there is only a limited 
number of studies at the regional level, we need to further enhance our understanding of 
the destination of capital flows.  
Lucas (1990) posits that eventually capital will flow from poor to rich countries, 
because of differences in human capital and capital market imperfections. This 
pioneering work has become known as the Lucas paradox. Tornell and Velasco (1992) 
also support the argument that capital flows from poor to rich countries. They found that 
both the lack of property rights (law enforcement) and institutions have been main 
driving forces behind this paradox, which they call “the Tragedy of the Commons”. The 
argument is also supported by Krugman (1993), who asserts capital tends to flow 
asymmetrically from the poor to the rich countries. 
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 Alfaro et al. (2005) emphasize that the Lucas paradox24 challenges the standard 
neoclassical theory that predicts that capital should flow from rich to poor (countries) or 
from countries with low return of capital to countries with high return of capital. The 
sources of paradox can be separated into two categories. First, there are fundamental 
aspects such as technological differences, lack of institutional structure, lacking factors of 
production, and unreliable government policies. Second, there are capital market 
imperfections that stem from asymmetric information and sovereign risk.  Previously, 
Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) also confirmed the lack of capital mobility internationally, 
because of the lack of international portfolio diversification, real interest differentials 
across countries, and the high correlation between domestic savings and investment.  
 If we were to project these studies that were carried out for the international level 
to the regional level, then we might end up with a similar conclusion, that capital tends to 
be imperfectly mobile, and that it may be asymmetrically mobile from the periphery to 
the core region.  One crucial element to explain this phenomenon is that geographical 
proximity may play a role in affecting economic behavior. 
Moreover, the advent of the New Economic Geography that was developed by 
Krugman (1991) based on Marshall (1890) has pointed out the importance of the 
economies of scale in explaining the clustering of particular industries. In such industries 
(including the Financial industry), the rate of return on capital is not necessarily a 
declining function of previous investments, but may well be an increasing function of the 
amount of capital which has been invested previously in a particular industry in a 
particular region. For this kind of industry, the integration of markets can lead to 
agglomeration and concentration in centres where the economies of large-scale operation 
can be best achieved. 
All in all, this case may undermine the integration of regional financial markets. 
Combined with imperfections of capital mobility, this may have substantial effects on the 
growth prospects of regional economies, particularly in less developed countries.  In 
other words, a large country with a core-periphery structure may well face problems of 
financial market segmentation.   
                                                 
24
 The notion of Lucas paradox is related to a subject that is listed as one out of six major “puzzles”in 
international macroecoomics (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). 
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5. Conclusions  
We have discussed how monetary policy can have real impacts on regional development 
especially through the interest rate and the bank lending channels, by using both 
theoretical and empirical approaches. Consistent with our simple diagrammatic analysis, 
most empirical studies also report heterogeneity of regional responses with respect to a 
common monetary shock. The main driving forces behind the asymmetric effects are 
inherent differences in the structures of the economic and the financial markets.  
Conventional studies have reported that, over time, regional financial markets 
especially in the USA have become more integrated, thus enhancing capital mobility. 
However, our own study argues that the generalization of such a hypothesis is 
problematic, especially if one takes into account some recent findings in Europe. 
Moreover, in huge less developed countries like Indonesia, India and China in where 
strong regional disparities are apparent, the extent of market segmentation could become 
more pronounced, resulting in limits to capital mobility. Barriers to mobility can be 
related to distance, culture, language and institutions, which tend to give rise to 
substantial information asymmetries.  
Furthermore, even though technological advances such as electronic banking 
services seem to have reduced the importance of distance substantially, there is still much 
evidence in both the USA and Europe suggesting that local banks still have a strong 
position in controlling local financial markets because they have superior information 
about their local markets.   
To conclude, this survey study of the literature shown that traditional approaches 
that tend to neglect the role of money, monetary policy or, more broadly, financial 
markets in affecting growth, including regional economies may be too simplistic. This 
argument is based on empirical evidence that capital is imperfectly mobile because of 
information asymmetries. We underlined the potentially important role of monetary 
policy in spurring regional development especially in emerging economies. Future 
research will focus on the role of the exchange rate channel in affecting regional 
development, as well as, on the role of fiscal policy as an alternative way to absorb 
asymmetric shocks. 
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